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3. There have been no major changes in the situation on the ground in Laos or South Vietnam. In Cambodia, prospects for governmental improvement are encouraging, though talk has not yet been reflected in actual action. Unless Lon Nol reverses field (always a possibility) he does seem prepared to make the new four-man governing council (himself, Sirik Matak, In Tam, Cheng Heng) into a meaningful body which will rule Cambodia more effectively than it has been ruled under Lon Nol alone. Little brother, Lon Non, still says he is leaving (after he helps his brother establish the council), but he is still physically present in Phnom Penh.

4. One other item affecting Cambodia arose during the week -- a slightly confused quadrille in connection with a request from the Vice President's office. One of the Vice President's staff aides, a Colonel Slack, called Dick Lehman directly to ask about the extent of Vietnamese Communist involvement in the fighting in Cambodia. OCI provided a one-page answer which discussed only the evidence concerning who is pulling the triggers of Communist guns in Cambodia. The answer, as you might expect, is that the Khmer Communists are doing almost all of the actual shooting at friendly forces. This ignores, however, the question of whether Hanoi controls the Khmer Communists, and whether the latter would continue fighting if Hanoi did not want them to. To correct the picture, we telephoned the Vice President's office and explained (a) that Hanoi had a major degree of control over Khmer Communist actions, and (b) that the question of who controlled the trigger-fingers in Cambodia was just as important as the nationalities of the trigger fingers.

5. We also sent down to the Vice President's office a copy of our recent memorandum to Dr. Kissinger entitled, "Hanoi and Sihanouk: The Emerging Communist Game Plan in Cambodia." This memorandum contains a comprehensive appraisal of Hanoi's present intentions in Cambodia, and also a balanced discussion of the degree to which North Vietnam is calling the Communist shots in Cambodia. The Vice President's aide, Colonel Slack, was very appreciative of our efforts.

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6. The Ellsberg trial is snarled in a procedural molehill out of which the defense, with some help from the judge, is trying to create a mountain. One of the RAND witnesses mentioned some early OSI investigative reports of whose existence the prosecution was unaware, and which cover no ground not well ploughed in other material given the defense long ago. The defense, however, is screaming "suppression of exculpatory material" and the judge is giving the prosecution a hard time. I flew to Los Angeles on Wednesday (25 April) expecting to testify Thursday or possibly Friday. The above described snarl blew up on Wednesday afternoon. Dave Nissen, the prosecutor -- with whom I had a four-hour session -- now wants to use me as his final rebuttal witness (clean-up hitter). There is no telling when I will be called, possibly Monday (30 April), perhaps Tuesday (1 May) or -- if there are further snarls -- even later in the week. Rather than cool my heels in Los Angeles, I returned to Washington (on 26 April), preferring to stand by here rather than there.

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George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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